Not all identities are created equal. Before you can govern access effectively, you need to know who or what is requesting it. IAM programs that only think about employees are leaving half the picture ungoverned.
The two identity categories
Every identity in your environment falls into one of two buckets: human or machine. The distinction isn’t just semantic; it determines how an identity authenticates, how long it should live, how you detect anomalies, and how you de-provision it when it’s no longer needed.
- Human identities
People-centric, behavior-based risk - Machine identities
Non-human, credential-based risk
Examples at a glance
| Human identities | Machine identities |
|---|---|
| Full-time employees Core workforce; identities managed from hire to retire via joiner-mover-leaver workflows.Internal | Cloud-native & container apps Kubernetes pods, serverless functions, and microservices that authenticate via service accounts or workload identity. |
| IT administrators Infrastructure and platform owners often have elevated, break-glass privileges. Require PAM controls and session recording. | CI/CD pipelines & DevOps tools Jenkins, GitHub Actions, GitLab CI. Authenticate to cloud and artifact registries; credentials must rotate and never be hardcoded. |
| Developers & engineers Build and deploy code; need access to source repos, cloud consoles, and test environments, ideally through federated SSO. | Automation & scripting engines Scheduled tasks, cron jobs, PowerShell/Bash scripts, and batch processors that run unattended with service credentials.Infrastructure |
| Contractors & temporary staff Time-limited engagements with scoped access. Must be auto-deprovisioned at contract end; not on an annual review cycle. | AI agents & autonomous assistants LLM-powered agents that act on behalf of users, call APIs, and may spawn sub-agents. Require non-human identity (NHI) classification and scoped, short-lived tokens. |
| Vendors & managed service providers Third-party organizations with ongoing privileged access. Governed through vendor PAM, least-privilege, and scoped JIT sessions. | IoT & operational technology devices Sensors, cameras, industrial controllers, and smart devices. Often use certificates or shared secrets; certificate lifecycle management is critical. |
| QA & testing teams Access to dev/staging environments; risk escalates when test credentials mirror production. Isolated identity domains are best practice. | RPA & third-party COTS bots UiPath, Automation Anywhere, and Blue Prism robots that log into systems mimicking human behavior. Often use vaulted credentials managed via CyberArk or Delinea. |
| Customer end-users (B2C/B2B) External customers accessing portals or apps. Governed via CIAM platforms (Okta Customer Identity, Auth0) with self-service registration and MFA. | Homegrown & web applications Internal apps (n-tier, static sites, APIs) that call other services using client credentials, API keys, or mutual TLS certificates. |
| Security & SOC analysts Investigators with read access to logs, SIEM, and threat intel platforms. Access should be auditable and scoped to prevent privilege creep. | Cloud service principals & IAM roles AWS IAM roles, Azure managed identities, and GCP service accounts. The backbone of cloud-native authorization — scope must be minimized and regularly reviewed. |
| Executives & board members High-value targets for social engineering and account takeover. Require strong MFA, phishing-resistant authenticators (FIDO2), and VIP monitoring. | API integrations & webhooks System-to-system connections using OAuth tokens, API keys, or HMAC signatures. Token rotation and scope validation prevent lateral movement. |
| Partner & B2B federated users External org employees accessing resources via federation (SAML/OIDC). Identity originates in a partner IdP — governance relies on trust agreements and attribute mapping. | Data pipelines & ETL processes Scheduled or event-driven jobs that extract, transform, and load data across systems. Use service identities with data-plane-only access. |
| Help desk & support staff Access to impersonate or reset user accounts. High-risk vector for social engineering; requires secondary approval for sensitive operations. | Digital certificates & PKI entities TLS/SSL certs, code-signing certs, and client certificates issued to devices or services. Certificate expiry and revocation management are core NHI hygiene. |
| Interns & apprentices Short-term, limited-access identities are often provisioned manually. Should follow the same joiner workflow as contractors with a defined expiry. | Security scanning & monitoring tools SIEM collectors, vulnerability scanners (Tenable, Qualys), EDR agents, and CSPM tools. Require read-wide or agent-level access — must be inventoried and governed like any other NHI. |
Why human identities require behavioral context
Human identities are inherently unpredictable; a legitimate user can act in ways that may look risky (signing in from a new country, accessing systems outside working hours). Effective governance here relies on behavioral baselines, contextual policies, and MFA enforcement.
- Employees, developers, and QA staff form the core identity population. Role-based access controls, regular access reviews, and separation of duties keep privilege creep in check.
- Contractors, vendors, and partners are the highest-risk segment. They arrive with entitlements negotiated outside IAM workflows and often linger after the engagement ends. Time-bound access and auto-deprovisioning are non-negotiable.
- Executives are high-value targets. FIDO2 phishing-resistant MFA and enhanced monitoring should be standard, not optional.
Why machine identities are the bigger blind spot
Most organizations have a handle on human identities — they live in Active Directory, Okta, or a similar directory. Machine identities are scattered: service accounts, API keys, certificates, tokens, and secrets spread across CI/CD pipelines, cloud workloads, IoT firmware, and AI agents. They often have no owner, no expiry, and no audit trail.
- Cloud service principals and IAM roles are the fastest-growing NHI category. Overly permissive roles are the root cause of most cloud breaches.
- AI agents are the emerging frontier — they act on behalf of humans, can spawn sub-agents, and need scoped, short-lived identities. See our post on identity agentic for a deep dive.
- Certificates and PKI entities are the silent risk — an expired cert can take down a production service instantly. Certificate lifecycle management belongs in every NHI program.
Key takeaways
- Build a unified identity inventory
- Separate the risk models
- Expire everything by default
- Classify AI agents as machine identities
- Apply least privilege to both categories
- Automate de-provisioning, do not rely on reviews
Gabriel Magarino
Gabriel Magarino – Senior Security Manager | IAM Evangelist - Experienced leader with over 20 years in the IT and cybersecurity industry, specializing in Identity & Access Management. Expert in Okta, One Identity, SailPoint (IdentityIQ & IdentityNow), OneLogin, Delinea, and CyberArk. Passionate about exploring IAM and emerging technologies, coaching, and training IAM teams. Holds a Master’s in Computer Science and multiple certifications, including Okta Professional & Administration, One Identity Architect & Instructor, SailPoint Identity Now, ITIL, Scrum Master, among others. Currently pursuing a PhD with a focus on Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence.